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PICTURE PERFECT? X-RAY SEARCHES AT
THE UNITED STATES BORDER
REQUIRE GUIDANCE
INTRODUCTION
Your plane touches ground in America: land of the free, home
of the brave. You left Colombia with nothing but a tattered carry-
on suitcase, the dress on your back, and a heart full of hopes and
dreams - dreams of freedom, education, and opportunity. You get
off the plane and are thrust into a whirlwind of hurried people,
bright lights and unfamiliar scents. As you head toward Customs,
your heart skips a beat as you think of the good fortune that lies
ahead. It won't be easy, but you are in America, and you can do
anything.
The man at Customs shouts at you. Your grasp on the English
language is shaky at best, and you are at a loss for words. You
sweat. You start mumbling, but your story - that you are going to
stay with your sister, that you want to go to school and get a job -
appears nonsensical in your broken English. A woman comes over
and briskly pats you down. She finds nothing. You realize then
that you are being herded away, taken to a small, dimly lit room.
The shouting continues, but you don't understand, and you don't
know how to defend yourself. Cold hands are all over you, search-
ing endlessly for something to validate their suspicion. She is
prodding, poking at your body, and you feel ashamed, inhuman.
You feel your dreams tearing at the seams as she rips away your
clothes. She forces you to bend over.
The United States Customs and Border Protection ("Cus-
toms") recently implemented a novel program that eliminates the
need to subject a suspected internal drug smuggler to intrusive
and undignified searches. This novel program pairs Customs with
the Department of Radiology at the University of Miami School of
Medicine ("Department of Radiology") and attempts to prevent
illegal narcotics from being smuggled into the United States.
Instead of having to perform invasive strip or body cavity
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searches, Customs agents can X-ray the abdomen of an internal
drug smuggling suspect, commonly known as a "balloon swal-
lower." The X-rays, taken at the airports, are transferred
instantly to radiologists who are able to determine whether the
suspect swallowed drugs in order to smuggle them into the United
States. The customs agents have a reply within a half an hour,
and the need for degrading searches is eliminated.
Part I of this note details how a balloon swallower operates to
smuggle illegal narcotics into the United States. Part II discusses
the background of the Fourth Amendment, and it provides a brief
history of non-routine border searches and the conflict among the
circuits surrounding the level of suspicion required for customs
agents to conduct these searches. This part also introduces the
notions of intrusion and indignity commonly associated with non-
routine border searches. Part III analyzes the partnership
between Customs and the Department of Radiology and the objec-
tives the partnership has at its origins. This section also describes
how these mobile X-ray units operate. Part IV asserts what Cus-
toms officials must do in order to ensure that X-ray searches are
not unreasonable or in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
reasonableness of an X-ray search must be evaluated according to
its level of intrusiveness, and the level of intrusiveness will subse-
quently determine the level of suspicion required before this type
of search can be conducted. It addresses the factors that can cause
an agent to have reasonable suspicion, as well as the safeguards
Customs officials must enact in order to prevent abuse of the
system.
I. WHAT IS A BALLOON SWALLOWER?
A major trend in smuggling illegal narcotics into the United
States involves the hiring of non-American drug runners to bring
cocaine, heroin and other drugs into this country through their
digestive tract.1 These smugglers are referred to as "swallowers,"
"internal smugglers," "alimentary canal smugglers" or "internal
drug carriers."2 While a large number of swallowers entering the
1. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1350 (l1th Cir. 1984) (explaining
that a drug runner is typically a non-American citizen who will smuggle cocaine into
the United States through his digestive tract); Alison Mylander Gregory, Smugglers
Who Swallow: The Constitutional Issues Posed by Drug Swallowers and Their
Treatment, 56 U. Prwr. L. REV. 323, 327 (1994) (describing that a typical internal drug
smuggler generally swallows heroin or other drug mixtures into a balloon or condom).
2. Gregory, supra note 1, at 324.
578
X-RAY SEARCHES
United States smuggle heroin from Nigeria,3 other commonly
known countries where drug smuggling is prevalent and where
smugglers swallow drugs in an effort to bring them into the
United States are Colombia 4 and Jamaica'.
Internal drug smuggling is "exceedingly difficult to detect."6 A
typical swallower imports illegal narcotics to the United States by
ingesting them through rubber objects.7 Generally, the drugs are
held in either balloons or the fingers of rubber gloves and then
covered in aluminum foil.' This contraption is next wrapped in
another balloon of prophylactic rubber which is then swallowed by
the smuggler who subsequently enters the United States and
excretes the balloons A typical swallower can carry up to sev-
enty of these balloons. ° Although a majority of alimentary canal
smugglers are men, whose larger size generally allows them to
ingest greater amounts of narcotics, 1 women are also involved" in
this dangerous but efficient trend in drug smuggling. A single
smuggler can average a net weight of about 300 grams of the drug
by smuggling internally."3 Balloon swallowers most likely smug-
gle narcotics because of the lucrative financial reward they receive
upon a successful smuggle.' 4 A swallower can earn anywhere from
a hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars for completing a trip,"
and the amount of money earned is generally proportional to the
weight of drugs smuggled. 6
Swallowers are difficult to detect due to their unique method
of operation,17 and Congress has recognized the challenge of catch-
3. Id. at 328.
4. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532 (1985).
5. Kaniffv. United States, 2002 WL 370210, N.D.I1l., Mar 08, 2002.
6. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 538-39.
7. United States v. Mejia, 770 F.2d 1378, 1380 n.1 (Ct. App. La., 1983).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Gregory, supra note 1, at 327 (noting that a swallower will generally ingest
approximately seventy drug-filled balloons or condoms).
11. Id. at 330-31.
12. Id.
13. ld. at 327.
14. ld. at 328 (explaining that despite the war on drugs, drug smuggling continues
to be a productive business due to the "financial rewards" given to the successful
smuggler).
15. Id. at 329.
16. Id.
17. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1350 (llth Cir., 1984) (discussing
that a customs agent's suspicion will be stirred by different circumstances because
swallowers follow a unique method of operation).
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ing these smugglers. 8 Because there are no visible external signs
of alimentary canal smuggling, inspectors may have difficulty in
obtaining the requisite amount of probable cause needed to arrest
or search. 9 Furthermore, the traditional use of drug detecting
canines, patdowns, and searches of luggage are all ineffective
methods to detect swallowed drugs.2 0 Thus, the Supreme Court
has held that, in order to protect the integrity of the United States
border, and in light of the difficulties in detecting alimentary drug
smuggling, a customs agent is entitled to stop, search and inspect
any person whom he believes is carrying contraband."' Such a
search, however, triggers concerns under the Fourth Amendment.
II. SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides for "the right of people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures."2 2 The Supreme Court has traditionally rooted its Fourth
Amendment analysis on searches of property.22 However, the
Court abandoned the principles of property law that limited the
application of the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States24
and instead expanded its scope to "protect[ ] people, not places."25
The majority in Katz upheld the idea that a man will "remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures" wherever he is.26 In his
concurrence, Justice Harlan established the now famous two-part
test used to determine whether a protected privacy interest exists:
(1) whether one exhibited an "actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy" and (2) whether that "expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 27 In essence, the Fourth
Amendment is violated if state action impinges upon one's actual
18. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532 (1985) (remarking
that Congress, in recognition of the difficulties that internal drug smugglers detect,
enacted Title 19 U.S.C. § 1582 which declares that "all persons coming into the
United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search
authorized . .. [by customs regulations].").
19. Id. at 541.
20. Gregory, supra note 1, at 324.
21. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 539.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. Stephen Vina, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports: Are Border Searches Seeing
Through the Fourth Amendment?, 8 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 417, 422 (2002).
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 359.
27. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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expectation of privacy, as well as one's reasonable expectation of
privacy.2"
Neither the majority nor the concurring opinions in Katz,
however, clearly establish the definition of a search. Furthermore,
in the case of an internal drug smuggler, the kind of action consid-
ered a violation of one's actual and reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy is still questionable. A search has two components,
beginning with the "planning of the invasion" and continuing until
there is "'effective appropriation' of the fruits of the search" to
prove the offense.29 Whenever the government executes this
course of conduct, the Fourth Amendment is likely to apply." As
for the search of one's body, the court in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Association"' held that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the Government must extract physical evidence from
a person's body, and/or if private medical facts may be revealed
about the person by collecting that evidence.2
Searches at the United States border, however, are an excep-
tion to the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. The task
of protecting our nation's borders is one burdened with an incalcu-
lable amount of responsibility.3 The border search thus prospers
as an exemption to the Fourth Amendment due to unique policy
considerations that recognize the demanding duty of protecting
the United States' borders.' The United States Government "has
exercised the right to control the movement of people and goods
across our national boundaries," even at the nation's outset.3 In
an unbroken chain of precedent, the Supreme Court has continu-
ously held that routine inspections at the border in order to "effec-
tuate this control" are not unreasonable searches in violation of
28. Vina, supra note 24, at 423.
29. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 897.
31. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
32. Greg Star, Airport Security Technology: Is the Use of Biometric Identification
Technology Valid Under the Fourth Amendment?, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 251,
259 (2002).
33. United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1003-4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
guarding our nation's borders is a job that carries with it an innumerable amount of
responsibility, and it is necessary to guard the United States borders in order to
protect security, health, and public well being).
34. Vina, supra note 24, at 424.
35. United States v. Asbury 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing United States
v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Landau v.
United States Attorney for Southern District of New York, 82 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936)).
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the Fourth Amendment.36 Thus, border searches have a "unique"
position in constitutional law,37 arising from the belief that our
international airports are viewed as "international gateways.""s
In order to protect national security, it is considered reasona-
ble to require one entering this country to identify that both him-
self and his belongings are legally able to come into the United
States. 9 Customs agents are entrusted with the great task of
defending our borders against those who attempt to arrive "with-
out authorization" or for "improper purpose,"40 such as those arriv-
ing with an agenda to further crime, transport hazardous
substances to the United States, or threaten the safety and secur-
ity of American citizens.41 Thus, routine inquiries regarding one's
reasons for coming to the United States and one's travel plans
incidental to his visit are questions that may be asked upon arri-
val even without any suspicion of wrongdoing. 42 The Supreme
Court has found that this theory holds particularly true when a
customs agent recognizes peculiar responses to questions, as well
as "unusual conduct, demeanor, or appearance.""
However, although the United States has a great interest in
protecting itself at its borders," some limitations do prevent
unnecessary infringements on the privacy of foreigners entering
our country. The next section will discuss the differences between
routine and non-routine searches at the border.
36. Asbury, 586 F.2d at 975.
37. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating
that border searches "have a unique status in constitutional law" as they "are not
subject to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment").
38. Bradley v. United States, 164 F.Supp. 2d 437, 447-48 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting
that because international airports are also considered to be international gateways,
Customs agents at these airports are thus subject to the requirements and standards
that apply to a border search).
39. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967).
40. United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1381 (5th Cir. 1983).
41. United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1006 (2001) (citing United States v.
Okafor, 285 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2002).
42. Mejia, 720 F.2d at 1381 (explaining that even without a suspicion of illegal
activity, the customs agent is not only entitled to ask questions but is also entitled to
responses to his questions and does not have an obligation to put the person being
questioned at ease).
43. Id.
44. Bradley v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 437, 448 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that a
person coming into the United States has less privacy rights upon entering the
country as opposed to a person already located in the interior of this country because
of the interest the United States has in protecting itself at its borders).
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A. Routine Versus Non-routine Border Searches
Congress has granted Customs officers virtually limitless
authority to search and detain foreigners upon their arrival to the
United States. 5 A customs agent need not have an objective justi-
fication, probable cause, or a warrant 6 to conduct a search,
because the officer is perceived to be regulating the collection of
duties and preventing contraband from entering this country.47
Searches of one's luggage or clothing, patdowns, and frisks for
weapons are considered routine searches that an agent may con-
duct regardless of his level of suspicion.4 Because these searches
only subject an entrant to a negligible amount of intrusion or
indignity,49 and because the person or item at inquiry is attempt-
ing to enter the United States from a foreign nation, 0 these types
of searches are deemed reasonable.
Non-routine searches, on the other hand, are subject to cer-
tain limitations. A search becomes "non-routine" when it extends
beyond the type of "routine" customs stop previously described."
Whereas most people expect to have their luggage checked, they
do not expect to be subjected to the intrusiveness of a strip search,
a body cavity search, or an X-ray search. 2 In order to conduct any
of the latter non-routine border searches, a Customs agent is
required to have some suspicion of drug smuggling or other illegal
activity. 3 The question then becomes one of determining what
exactly constitutes "suspicion".
B. Definition of Suspicion and Other Tests Vary
Among Circuits
Over the last several decades, the circuits have offered differ-
45. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344 (lth Cir. 1984).
46. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (describing
that the Executive Branch, since the origin of this Republic, has been granted by
Congress "plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border,
without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and
to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country").
47. Id.
48. Vina, supra note 24, at 425.
49. Id. at 426.
50. Id.
51. United States v. Asbury 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2nd Cir. 1978).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 975-6 (describing that a border official cannot perform a search that will
cause a great intrusion of privacy unless he has "a suspicion of illegal concealment
that is based upon something more than the border crossing, and the suspicion should
be substantial enough to make the search a reasonable exercise of authority").
2004] 583
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ing opinions regarding not only the definition of suspicion, but
also the tests regarding how to determine suspicious activity. In
1978, the Second Circuit held in U.S. v. Asbury "4 that, to conduct a
non-routine search, a border official must have a suspicion of ille-
gal concealment that is substantiated beyond mere border cross-
ing, and this suspicion must be confirmed prior to taking action
beyond a routine search." This opinion varied not only from the
Ninth Circuit's decision that there must be "real suspicion," but
also from the Fifth Circuit's adherence to its own "reasonable sus-
picion" standard.' The Asbury court relied on the theory that rea-
sonableness should be determined by utilizing all the facts of each
specific case.57 The court considered factors such as excessive ner-
vousness, unusual conduct, an informant's tip, information
derived from a traveling companion, computerized information
showing pertinent criminal propensities, and loose-fitting or bulky
clothing to be indicative of illegal activity. 8 Other factors the court
considered were an itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing, discovery
of incriminating matter during routine searches, lack of employ-
ment or a claim of self employment, indications of drug addiction,
inadequate luggage, and evasive or contradictory answers. 9 While
the court recognized that the question of whether a search is rea-
sonable should be determined by balancing the suspicion of the
customs officer against the invasiveness or offensiveness of the
intrusion,60 this decision failed to establish a clear guideline as to
when a non-routine search is acceptable.
Several years later, the question was addressed again in two
other landmark cases in Louisiana and Florida. In 1983, the Fifth
Circuit appeared to parallel the Asbury case in U.S. v. Mejia,6 ' also
stating that as a search becomes more intrusive, it must be accom-
panied by a correspondingly higher level of suspicion of illegal
activity.2 However, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its established
54. Id. at 975.
55. Id. at 975-76.
56. Id. at 976. The Ninth Circuit's "real suspicion" standard comes from United
States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970), and the Fifth Circuit's
"reasonable suspicion" standard comes from United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d 1206,
1208 (5th Cir. 1977).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 976-77.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 976.
61. United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 1382. The court describes that "the greater the level of suspicion, the
more intrusive the search may be." Id.
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"reasonable suspicion" standard." In that case, Mejia, the defen-
dant, arrived in New Orleans from Colombia and was subjected to
a primary inspection by a customs official.' He was subsequently
sent to a secondary area for more questioning because he did not
speak English and "was arriving from a country known to be a
source of narcotics."65 The customs officers noticed several discrep-
ancies in Mejia's statements, leading them to suspect that he was
an internal drug smuggler.66 At the request of the officers, Mejia
consented to an X-ray exam, which revealed numerous foreign
bodies in his abdomen that were later found to contain cocaine.
6
1
The defendant was consequently convicted of importing and pos-
sessing cocaine, but he contended that his consent to the X-ray
exam was invalid because it was coerced under a totality of the
circumstances test.'
The Mejia court elaborated upon several factors. It first
acknowledged previous decisions and upheld the idea of "reasona-
ble suspicion" in order to conduct a non-routine border search.69
Furthermore, it stated that one can consider information based on
a smuggler profile, past experience and training of customs
officers, and preliminary questioning of the entrant in determin-
ing whether there is reasonable suspicion.7" The court also
declared that intrusiveness can be measured by considering fac-
tors such as embarrassment, indignity, and invasion of privacy.71
One year later, in U.S. v. Vega-Barvov2, the Eleventh Circuit
applied the reasonableness requirement for border searches to
body searches.73 Vega-Barvo was a single woman, traveling alone
from Colombia, a country known as a common source of illegal
63. Id.





69. Id. at 1381-82 (explaining that "reasonable suspicion is sufficient" to perform a
search at a national border, and that "ftll-blown probably cause" is not required).
70. Id. at 1382.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1984).
73. Id. at 1344. The court explains that they have previously applied the
reasonableness requirement by using a flexible test that adjusts the level of suspicion
necessary to perform a search in accordance with the level of intrusiveness of that
search. Id. The greater the level of intrusiveness, the greater the level of suspicion
necessary to perform the search. Id. The Supreme Court has used this approach to
search the vehicles of illegal aliens near the border, and there "is no reason to believe
that this same flexible approach would not apply to body searches." Id.
20041 585
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drugs.74 Several factors regarding her entrance into the United
States aroused suspicion among the officers, and she was thus
taken to a search room for a patdown." The search uncovered
nothing, however, leading the officials to conclude that she was
smuggling drugs internally." Vega-Barvo was then transferred to
a local hospital where she signed a consent form and was X-
rayed." Her X-rays displayed foreign bodies in her stomach, caus-
ing her to confess to swallowing 135 condoms filled with cocaine."
Prior to her trial, Vega-Barvo moved to suppress the cocaine on
the grounds that the X-ray search violated her Fourth Amend-
ment rights.79
Although the Vega-Barvo court followed a test similar to that
of Mejia in balancing the level of intrusiveness against the level of
suspicion to determine the reasonableness requirement necessary
for non-routine border searches," the Vega-Barvo court introduced
several new tests. The court first determined that a strip search
can only be conducted if a customs agent has a particularized "rea-
sonable suspicion," and that such standard is met if a person
behaves in an "articulably suspicious manner."" The court next
declared, as in Mejia, that in order to determine the intrusiveness
of a border search, the focus must be on the indignity of the
search.82 The court extended this Mejia analysis, however, by rec-
ognizing three factors relating to the indignity suffered by an
entrant subject to a non-routine border search. 3 These three fac-
tors were "the physical contact between the searcher and the per-
son searched, exposure of intimate body parts and use of force," all
factors which can potentially infringe upon one's right to privacy. 4
While all of these cases cast some light and insight on the
question of how to conduct non-routine border searches, there still
remained a lack of Supreme Court precedent setting forth the
74. Id. at 1341.
75. Id. at 1343. The court considered Vega-Barvo's nervousness, in combination
with the facts that she was traveling alone, that she was carrying only one piece of
poor quality luggage, and that there were several inconsistencies regarding her
employment to raise the requisite level of suspicion.





81. Id. at 1345.
82. Id. Precedent indicates that the level of indignity a search entails, not merely
extensiveness alone, will determine the intrusiveness of a search.




exact standards and level of suspicion necessary to perform these
searches. The next section will discuss the Supreme Court deci-
sion that finally addressed the fundamental doctrines governing
non-routine border searches.
C. The Supreme Court Addresses the Issue
In 1985, the long-awaited Supreme Court decision of U.S. v.
Montoya de Hernandez"5 addressed the essential principles gov-
erning non-routine border searches. Respondent Montoya de Her-
nandez traveled from Bogota, Colombia to the Los Angeles
International Airport, where she was questioned by customs
agents who examined both her passport and luggage. 6 After this
examination, the agents suspected that she was an alimentary
canal smuggler and subsequently detained her for approximately
16 hours until customs agents received a court order authorizing a
pregnancy test, an X-ray and a rectal examination." The Montoya
court held that detaining an entrant at the border "beyond the
scope of a routine customs search and inspection[ I is justified at
its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts surround-
ing the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler
is smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal."8 Although
Montoya was a landmark case in that it determined that a cus-
toms official, based on a totality of circumstances test, must have
reasonable suspicion to detain a suspect at the border, it left an
extremely important question unanswered. As it was not specifi-
cally presented with the issue, Montoya failed to address what
level of suspicion, if any, is necessary to conduct non-routine
searches at the border, including strip searches, body cavity
searches, or involuntary X-ray searches.8 9
D. Involuntary X-ray Searches: Inconsistencies
Continue
In spite of its holding in Montoya, the Supreme Court has yet
to determine the level of suspicion necessary to justify an X-ray
search of a person crossing the international border.90 X-ray exam-
inations raise the question of whether an involuntary X-ray exam-
85. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 541.
89. Id. at 541 n.1.
90. Kaniffv. United States, 2002 WL 370210 at 10, N.D.ll., Mar 08, 2002.
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ination is more similar to a strip search which would only require
"reasonable suspicion," or whether the intrusion is substantial
enough to warrant a greater level of suspicion.91 Though one's vol-
untary consent to an X-ray search does not generally implicate
Fourth Amendment concerns,92 there remains only a minimal
amount of case law regarding involuntary X-ray searches and the
level of suspicion they require.
In one of the first modern cases regarding involuntary X-ray
searches, the California Court of Appeals held in U.S. v. Ek s3 that
the strict standard obligatory for a body cavity search is also
applicable to an X-ray search. 4 The California Court found that
even though an X-ray does not involve the same level of indignity
associated with a strip or body cavity search, it is nonetheless
more intrusive because the search can potentially be harmful to
one's health25 The Mejia reasoning the following year contradicts
the analysis in Ek. The Mejia court determined that an X-ray
search is not "excessively intrusive" if performed by hospital per-
sonnel who question the patient about his health history and any
previous exposure to X-rays prior to the X-rays being taken.96
A more detailed analysis regarding non-routine X-ray
searches occurred the year after Mejia in Vega-Barvo. That court
held similarly to Mejia in concluding that an X-ray is no more
invasive than a strip search. It evaluated X-ray searches in light
of a three-part test to determine the effects this type of search
may have on one's personal dignity.97 It concluded that X-rays do
not require any sort of physical contact between the searcher and
the person searched, nor do they expose any intimate body parts
91. Steven R. Vina, Protecting our Perimeter: "Border Searches" Under the Fourth
Amendment, Report for Congress, at http:l/www.thememoryhole.orglcrs/more-reports/
RL31826.pdf
92. Id. The court explains that if one consents to an X-ray examination, the court
is not required to discuss the level of suspicion that would justify an involuntary X-
ray examination.
93. 676 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982)
94. Id. at 382.
95. Id. (noting that while an X-ray search is not necessarily as humiliating as
other types of non-routine body searches, it can potentially have harmful effects on
one's health and "goes beyond the passive inspection of body surfaces").
96. United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983). The Court
interpreted the X-ray search performed on defendant as not excessively intrusive. Id.
Defendant's X-ray was taken in a hospital by hospital employees, and he was asked
questions both about his medical history and any exposure he may have had to X-rays
prior to the X-rays being taken. Id. Neither customs agents nor hospital employees
executed a physical search on Mejia's body, nor did they subject him to "indignity or
embarrassment." Id.
97. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 1984).
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to the searcher." Furthermore, a hospital will not usually perform
an X-ray search without the patient's consent.9 In light of these
factors, the court held that utilizing an X-ray to search one's intes-
tinal cavity is more dignified and less intrusive than other types of
non-routine searches. °1 0 The Vega-Barvo court compared an X-ray
to the use of an emetic used to induce vomiting, and found the
former to be much less humiliating.'' For these reasons, the X-ray
was determined to be a "relatively unintrusive" search.0 2
The 1985 Montoya case, as previously mentioned, said little
regarding X-ray searches, although Justice Stevens' concurrence
is worth noting. Stevens believed that anyone not pregnant who
was reasonably suspected of alimentary canal smuggling can be
required by customs agents to acquiesce to an X-ray examination
as "incident to a border search."' This idea, however, is contro-
versial. In his dissent, Justice Brennan claimed that Stevens
failed to consider the harmful effects that X-rays can potentially
have on one's health.0 ' Brennan reasoned that warrant and prob-
able cause requirements could safeguard and govern Justice Ste-
vens' usage of X-rays for the purpose of detecting drugs in the
alimentary canal or other criminal-investigative purposes.0 5
In 2002, the Kaniff v. U.S.' °0 court noted that the Fifth,
Eighth and Eleventh circuits are all in accord that an agent's rea-
sonable suspicion that one is an internal smuggler may be enough
to justify an X-ray search, even if the examination lacked con-
sent. ' 7 In Simpson v. State,'° decided one year later by the Geor-
gia Appellate Court, the court expanded the Kaniff analysis by
98. Id. at 1347-48. The court discusses the difference between a passenger
required to walk through a magnometer and a passenger being subjected to a pat-
down search. Furthermore, the Court recognizes that a significant factor in the
constitutionality of searches at the United States border is the amount of
embarrassment caused by the exposure of private body parts.
99. Id. (Explaining that much indignity results when a person is physically forced
by an agent to submit to a search, and that "the constitutionality of nonconsensual
bodily searches has proved a troublesome question for courts").
100. Id. at 1348.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 545 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
104. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Stevens must have
been convinced that "the health effects of x-irradiation on human beings stand
established as so minimal as to be little cause for concern").
105. Id.
106. Kaniff v. United States, 2002 WL 370210, N.D.Ill., Mar 08, 2002.
107. Id. at 10.
108. 588 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. App. 2003).
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providing a clarification of the reasonableness standard. The
Georgia Court determined that an examination is reasonable if an
agent possesses "objective, articulable facts" that can justify the
intrusion of an X-ray search as to the particular place and person
to be searched." 9 The court explained that, upon an agent's pos-
session of reasonable suspicion that one is an alimentary canal
smuggler, the suspected smuggler may be transferred to a hospi-
tal for an X-ray exam.' The examination, however, may not be
physically forced, despite the fact that the suspect may not have
voluntarily consented to it."'
The aforementioned cases, though somewhat explanatory,
leave many issues unresolved. The exact level of suspicion
required to perform a non-routine search such as an X-ray exami-
nation remains unknown. Similarly, the questions of how intru-
sive an actual X-ray exam is, and the amount of personal
information that can be discovered by those performing the X-ray
examination also remain unanswered. Furthermore, though an X-
ray may not be mentally or emotionally degrading to one's state of
mind, it is unclear whether an X-ray's hazardous or taxing effects
on the human body outweigh these mental conditions. These
questions will continue to be deliberated until the Supreme Court
answers the challenge of this controversial issue.
III. THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CUSTOMS AND THE
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
Doctors at the Department of Radiology have begun to play a
key role in drug enforcement at our nation's borders."2 A "unique
program" pairs Customs with the Department of Radiology in an
attempt to combat drug smugglers". at airports around the coun-
try, including Miami International Airport, Ft. Lauderdale Inter-
national Airport, and airports in New Jersey, Houston, Baltimore
and San Juan."4 The program brings suspected drug smugglers to
portable facilities at these airports in order to determine whether
109. Id. at 449.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. X-ray Vision: Doctors Play Key Role in Drug Enforcement, UNIVERSITY OF
MIAMI MEDICINE, Fall, 2003, at 4 [hereinafter X-ray Vision].
113. Id.
114. Interview with Dr. Luis Rivas, Assistant Professor of Radiology and Chief of
Trauma and Emergency Radiology, University of Miami, in Coral Gables, Fla.
(November 12, 2003) [hereinafter Rivas Interview].
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there are foreign bodies in the suspect's digestive system."5 The
images are then stored on a database that is shared by Customs
and the Department of Radiology."16 After the initial X-ray, the
radiologists are immediately paged and the images are digitized
and transferred to the doctors' computers at the medical center for
analysis."7 The Customs agents have a reply within a half an hour
as to whether the suspect is an alimentary canal smuggler."8 Dr.
Luis Rivas, assistant professor of radiology and chief of trauma
and emergency radiology at UM.Jackson, stated that the program
has been working well, although he did not have exact statistics
regarding the number of successful arrests made after the X-ray
examinations." 9 Nonetheless, Dr. Rivas noted that the Customs
agents in Miami "have a good track record" as to the number of
suspects subjected to these X-ray examinations and the amount of
suspects who actually tested positive for foreign matters in their
digestive tract.' In Puerto Rico, a similar program using mobile
X-ray equipment to detect internal drug smuggling has achieved
"[i]n the first half of 2002... a more than 200 percent increase in
apprehended swallower cases over the entire previous fiscal
year.',
21
In previous years, Customs officials in Miami had to take sus-
pected internal drug smugglers to Jackson Memorial Hospital for
the X-ray examination. 122 The new program, however, allows the
agents to preserve both manpower and time as it saves officials
repeated trips to and from the hospital. 2 Furthermore, Dr. Rivas
believes that this partnership is not limited to protecting United
States borders and keeping illegal drugs out of the nations' com-
munities. 24 From a medical standpoint, he explains that the pro-
gram simultaneously protects the health and safety of the







121. Jesus Betancourt, Mobile X-ray Equipment Aids in Catching Drug
Swallowers, U.S. Customs Today at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2002/
October/prswallow.xml
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poses, especially cocaine,'26 can be deadly.'2 7 If a swallowed balloon
or other object containing heroin or cocaine ruptures in the stom-
ach, the drug can travel directly into the bloodstream. 128 Addition-
ally, the packets may create a bowel obstruction in the digestive
tract.'29 As this partnership provides the radiologists capabilities
for both quick analysis of X-rays and a means of electronic com-
munication with the customs agents, the doctors have the ability
to call immediately for emergency care if warranted.' ° Thus,
while the main objective of this partnership is to prevent illegal
narcotics from entering and being distributed within the United
States, the program does have at its origin a dual purpose.2 '
V. ENSURING PROGRAM'S CONFORMITY WITH THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
As previously discussed, one's expectation of privacy is
reduced when seeking entrance to the United States, 2 and the
government's interest in protecting the border has been found to
be of greater consequence then the privacy rights of the individ-
ual."'33 In light of this interest, the question becomes whether the
government has unlimited authority to subject anyone entering
the United States to a non-routine border search. The ease of the
new X-ray program, coupled with the lack of requirement for a
warrant or probable cause, will make it relatively easy for customs
agents to abuse the system based on lack of reasonable suspicion
or inarticulable hunches. As there is currently no Supreme Court
decision governing the level of suspicion necessary to conduct a
non-routine border search, it is imperative that Customs agents
working with the Department of Radiology comply with specific
requirements to ensure that no suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights are unnecessarily violated.
In order to discover what standards should govern the proce-
dure, it is important to first consider how an X-ray exam works
and whether it is considered to be a "search" in connection with
the Fourth Amendment. This should be followed by analyzing the
level of intrusiveness that an X-ray search demands. Finally, one
126. Rivas Interview, supra note 116.
127. X-ray Vision, supra note 114, at 4.
128. Id.
129. See supra text accompanying note 126.
130. X-ray Vision, supra note 114, at 4.
131. Rivas Interview, supra note 116.
132. Kaniffv. United States, 2002 WL 370210 at 6, N.D.Ill., Mar 08, 2002.
133. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 540.
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must consider what level of suspicion corresponds with this level
of intrusiveness.
A. The X-ray Exam as a Search
An abdominal X-ray, such as the type used in this program,'
typically provides a picture of abdominal organs and structures,
including the stomach, liver, spleen, diaphragm and both the large
and small intestines.13 5 Generally, a patient lies on his back on a
table, and an apron or shield made of lead is placed over the pelvic
area in order to prevent the X-ray exposure to that area.3 " A
woman's ovaries, however, are unable to be protected during this
test as they are too close to the abdominal organs that require the
X-ray exam.137 The patient must hold his breath during the exam,
and in order to prevent the pictures from blurring, he cannot move
while the X-ray is being taken.' a While a "supine abdominal X-
ray" picture is taken with the patient lying on his back, the techni-
cian can also take an X-ray of the patient as he is standing up. 9
This erect abdominal view can depict whether there is a blockage
of the intestines, as well as whether there is air leaking through a
hole in the stomach or intestines. 4 ' The whole process takes
approximately five to ten minutes, and the pictures can usually be
developed within five minutes.'
The Supreme Court has encountered several different scena-
rios regarding what constitutes a search of the human body. In
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,"' the Supreme
Court decided that breath, blood and urine tests are considered
searches under the Fourth Amendment.' The Court explained
that a search occurs when one's skin is penetrated with the inten-
tion of receiving a blood sample.'" Furthermore, the court
134. Rivas Interview, supra note 116.
135. Renee Spengler, RN, BSN, Abdominal X-ray, WebMD Health at http://my.
webmd.com/contentlhealthwise/88/21951.htm?lastselectedguid=5FE84E90-BC77-40







142. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
143. Greg Star, Airport Security Technology: Is the Use of Biometric Identification
Technology Valid Under the Fourth Amendment?, 20 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 251,
258 (2002).
144. Id. at 259.
2004] 593
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3
acknowledged that in addition to the specific issue being tested
for, the collection and examination of one's blood or urine can
potentially reveal "a host of private medical facts about an [indi-
vidual], including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or dia-
betic."'45 Consequently, the court held that the collection and
analysis of one's urine sample "intrudes upon expectations of pri-
vacy that society has long recognized as reasonable."'46 While an
X-ray exam is not a physical intrusion or piercing of the skin in a
literal sense, the fact that it enables one to view images under-
neath the skin generally considered private renders it a search
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Intrusiveness
To determine the intrusiveness of a non-routine body search,
one must consider whether the definition of intrusiveness con-
cerns "whether one search will reveal more than another," or
whether it is construed "in terms of the indignity that will be suf-
fered by the person being searched."'47 The Vega-Barvo court con-
sidered whether an X-ray search is more or less intrusive than a
body cavity search.' It determined that although an X-ray does
not infringe upon one's dignity as much as a search of one's body
cavities, an X-ray can potentially reveal much more than a body
cavity search. 49 Furthermore, the exposure to potential health
risks or injury is also relevant to the intrusiveness of a search. In
light of these concerns, the intrusiveness level of an X-ray search
should be evaluated using three factors: (1) How revealing is the
search and how much personal medical information can be discov-
ered from performing this X-ray examination? (2) What harmful
or taxing effects can an X-ray examination have on the human
body, and how likely are these effects to occur? (3) Does one suffer
a loss of dignity when undergoing an X-ray examination? The fol-
lowing sections analyze each of these factors.
1. Medical Information Revealed
The amount of personal medical information that can be
revealed by an X-ray exam may correlate to the intrusiveness of
145. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
146. Id.





the search. ' Previously, courts found that both the collection and
analysis of blood and urine can display numerous medical facts
about an individual that he may have otherwise desired to keep
private, including whether one is "epileptic, pregnant or dia-
betic."' These searches have thus been found to intrude upon
one's privacy and implicate the Fourth Amendment. 52 In addition,
another type of analysis, the retina scan, can reveal medical condi-
tions including high blood pressure, AIDS, pregnancy, as well as
whether one suffers from diabetes, arteriosclerosis, and hyperten-
sion. 5 Because the retina scan can reveal information that would
be otherwise irretrievable if not for the physical intrusion, it also
can be considered a search."'
Analogous to these searches, the X-ray is a search within the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment "because the machine's primary
purpose is to locate items 'where there is normally an expectation
of privacy... .""' There are several conditions that can be discov-
ered if one is subjected to an X-ray search of his abdomen. The X-
ray can reveal problems in the urinary tract, or it can show a
blockage or perforation of the intestine. 56 The X-ray can also
reveal problems such as abdominal masses, enlarged organs, or an
accumulation of fluid in the abdominal area."7 Certain types of
abnormal calcifications, such as kidney stones or gallstones as
well as trauma to the abdominal tissue are also medical conditions
that can be revealed by an abdominal X-ray. ' Thus, an X-ray
exam of one's abdomen in search of foreign bodies may also reveal
other medical information that one may have wanted to keep pri-
vate due to its personal nature. These other discoverable medical
conditions correlate to the intrusion level of an X-ray and the level
of suspicion necessary to perform the X-ray.
150. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
151. Star, supra note 149, at 259.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 255.
154. Id. at 261.
155. Vina, supra note 24, at 430.
156. David Webner, M.D., Abdominal Film, MEDLINEplus Medical Encyclopedia
at http:l/www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003815.htm#Definition; see also
Jefferey Heit, M.D., Department of Internal Medicine, Abdominal Film, Yahoo
Health Encyclopedia at http-'fhealth.yahoo.com/healt/encyclopedia/003815/0.html
(February 13, 2004).
157. Webner, supra note 162.
158. Id.
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2. Harmful Effects of X-ray Examinations
Unlike a urine test, a blood test or a breathalizer, an X-ray
exam can have significant effects on the human body. Some have
argued that the medical effects created by an X-ray examination
should control the issue of intrusiveness. 1 9 X-ray exams, notwith-
standing the fact that they only use low levels of radiation, may
create a slight risk of damage to any cells or tissue exposed to the
radiation. 6 ' Overexposure to X-rays can create a risk of tissue
destruction or acute burns to the skin,' and routine X-rays have
been said to take approximately six days off the life expectancy of
a person.12 In spite of these dangers, the risk of damage created
by the X-ray is considered relatively minor in comparison with
the potential benefits of the test."
Another effect that must be considered, however slight, is the
effect that radiation can have on a pregnant woman. Generally an
abdominal X-ray will not be performed on a pregnant woman
because the exposure to radiation could potentially damage the
developing fetus." Radiation can cause the fetus to have birth
defects or growth retardation, and it also can potentially be
fatal. "' Exposure to X-rays is measured in units of radiation
absorbed doses ("rads"),'% and during a diagnostic X-ray, one is
exposed to anywhere between .20 and 5,000 millirads, or .2 and 5
rads, dependent upon what sort of X-ray is utilized.'67 Diagnostic
X-rays that use less than 5 rads have not been reported to cause
birth defects or growth retardation. 68 While X-rays of the neck,
head, chest or outer extremities generally expose a fetus to less
than 1 rad, X-rays of the pelvis and abdomen can result in higher
159. Vina, supra note 24, at 430.
160. Renee Spengler, RN, BSN, Abdominal X-ray, WebMD Health at http:/Imy.
webmd.com/contentlhealthwise/88/21951.htm?lastselectedguid=5FE84E90-BC77-40
56-A91C-9531713CA348} (December 22, 2003).
161. Vina, supra note 24, at 430.
162. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 561 (1985) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (citing Gregg, Effects of Ionizing Radiations on Humans, in 2 Handbook of
Medical Physics 404 (R. Waggener ed. 1982)).
163. Spengler, supra note 166.




166. X-Ray Radiation and Pregnancy, HealthGoods at httpJ/www.heathgoods.com
Education/Health_Information/Pregnancy/xjray-and-pregnancy.htm.
167. SeeHerman, supra note 170.
168. Id; The Safety of X-rays During Pregnancy, American Academy of Family
Physicians at http://www.aafp.org/afp/990401ap/990401b.html.
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exposures.'69 Even if one is not yet pregnant but merely trying to
conceive, it remains unwise to be exposed to radiation if it is not
absolutely necessary. 170
3. X-ray Searches and the Loss of Dignity
While some non-routine body searches can subject a person to
extreme indignity, X-rays have been determined to "cause less
embarrassment, indignity, and invasion of privacy than .. . an
ordinary strip search." 7 ' The Vega-Barvo analysis is beneficial in
determining the invasiveness of an X-ray examination. An X-ray
requires little, if any, physical contact between the searcher and
the person being searched.'72 The searcher is not stroking or prod-
ding at one's body, and the X-ray eliminates the awkwardness or
invasiveness one might feel resulting from an agent's search of his
rectal or other body cavity. Furthermore, an X-ray does not dis-
play intimate body parts that would cause embarrassment or
humiliation on part of the suspect.'73 Whereas a strip or body cav-
ity search can be extremely degrading in that it exposes one's
naked body to unfamiliar persons in threatening situations, an X-
ray does not require such shameful measures. Though X-rays may
reveal parts of the body not typically seen by an outsider, the level
of privacy or modesty attached to these body parts is compara-
tively low, as they do not conjure up the same thoughts or sugges-
tions associated with a naked body. Thus, a search through an X-
ray examination is not as humiliating or intrusive as a strip or
body cavity search.'74 Lastly, in contrast to other non-routine
searches, an X-ray examination is not likely to require the use of
force by the searcher.'75 The only time a question of force may be
encountered is when a suspect absolutely refuses to give consent
to the X-ray.
An X-ray examination also resolves the problem of using
other undignified measures that can result in extreme humilia-
tion on part of the suspect. In Montoya, the inspectors held the
respondent for approximately 16 hours in order to wait for her
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Kaniffv. United States, 2002 WL 370210 at 10, N.D.I11., Mar 08, 2002 (citing
United States v. Reyes, 821 F.2d 168, 171 (2nd Cir. 1987), noting United States v.
Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983)).
172. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 1984).
173. Id.
174. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1348 (11th Cir. 1984).
175. See supra note 99.
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bowels to move, even though they know she would suffer through
hours of "humiliating discomfort."'76 An X-ray exam potentially
eliminates this procedure as it can lessen the need for the
retrieval and search of one's relieved bodily functions.'77 Even
though the passing of bowel movements can, like urination, be
considered a routine bodily function that is not subject to a war-
rant requirement,'178 a search of a person's feces can be deemed so
grossly intrusive as to "shock the conscience." 179 Thus, as com-
pared to other types of non-routine searches at the border, an X-
ray examination can eliminate the use of more intrusive and
humiliating methods of searching the suspect.
C. Level of Suspicion Needed to Safeguard Abuse
Courts apply a reasonable suspicion standard when it is nec-
essary for a customs agent to conduct a mildly intrusive search on
a person suspected of being an alimentary canal smuggler."' The
intrusiveness level of the search correlates directly with the level
of suspicion the customs agent must have of the suspect's wrong-
doing."' As analyzed, an X-ray search is considered to be rela-
tively intrusive. Although the humiliation suffered by the suspect
as the result of an X-ray search is slight, the amount of private
information that can be learned by the examiner, as well as the
risk of harmful effects to the patient, can be significant. While
these effects seem to justify a higher level of suspicion, one factor
remains to be considered. Alimentary canal smugglers place
themselves in extremely precarious positions by smuggling drugs
176. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985) (discussing
the "humanity" of the customs agents' decision to hold respondent until she had a
bowel movement, even with the knowledge that she would suffer "many hours of
humiliating discomfort" if she did not choose to have an X-ray examination).
177. Gregory, supra note 1, at 356.
178. Id. at 357 (noting the decision of Ewing v. State, 310 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. App.
1974) where the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a urine sample can be tested
without the requirement of a warrant because urination is considered to be a "routine
bodily function").
179. Id. at 356.
180. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 541 (explaining that the "reasonable suspicion" standard
is applicable "in a number of contexts and effects a needed balance between private
and public interests when law enforcement officials must make a limited intrusion on
less than probable cause. It thus fits well into the situations involving alimentary
canal smuggling at the border" because this kind of internal smuggling cannot be
detected by the naked eye, and inspectors will not generally have probable cause
necessary to arrest or search).
181. United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982).
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in this manner.'82 Internal drug smuggling can be fatal if the swal-
lowed balloons burst or leak inside the smuggler's stomach.8 " The
question then becomes how much mercy the government should
take on these people who have little value for their own lives.
Because the measures that balloon swallowers take to commit
their crimes are extreme and degrading, it is essential for "law
enforcement officials to take comparably extreme measures to
stop their drug trafficking."'84 While considerations of the effects
an X-ray may have on the human body are not to be brushed
aside, the risks to the lives of drug smugglers triggered from an X-
ray exam are much less significant than the risk of death a smug-
gler faces by his own decision to transport drugs internally. Thus,
in light of these factors, a greater level of suspicion is not neces-
sary. The reasonable suspicion standard required to detain a pas-
senger"8 5 should also be applicable to X-ray searches.
While Montoya declares that reasonable suspicion requires an
officer to have a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting
the entrant,' this standard can still produce vague and ambigu-
ous instruction. It is important for customs agents to have exact
instructions on the parameters of their search, including what to
look for and how many factors are necessary to determine the req-
uisite level of suspicion. The Asbury standards' 7 are useful in dis-
cerning what factors an agent must meet to form an objective
basis of suspicion. These factors, however, are not exhaustive.
One of the most important factors that the Asbury standards do
not consider is that of the agent's experience. A trained officer can
"perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be
wholly innocent to the untrained eye."88 An agent's training,
therefore, in combination with other factors, should be a constant
consideration in determining the suspicion level of a suspect. Fur-
ther, there should be a sliding scale that balances the officer's
training and experience with the number of factors he needs to
attain. The more experience an officer has, the more he will be
able to recognize the probable signs that one is an internal drug
182. See X-ray Vision, supra note 114, at 4.
183. Id.
184. Gregory, supra note 1, at 326.
185. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 541.
186. Id. (citing United States v. Cortez 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 66
L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); id., at 418, 101 S. Ct., at 695, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21,
n.18, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, n. 18, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
187. United States v. Asbury 586 F.2d 973, 976-7 (2nd Cir. 1978).
188. United States v. Santibanez Garcia, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1344 (M.D. Fla,
2000) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 563, 100 S. Ct. 1870).
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smuggler. Conversely, the less training an agent has, the more
factors he should be required to recognize as he does not have the
same knack for detecting a balloon swallower as an experienced
officer.
Even the most trained officer, however, cannot rely on mere
hunches. Thus, there are several factors that cannot constitute
suspicion if they are not accompanied by any other outlandish
behavior. While the inconsistencies in one's trip description may
indicate a sign of illegal activity,'89 this factor alone is not disposi-
tive. Many entrants to the United States do not speak English or
Spanish, and the language barrier and inability to properly com-
municate may account for some of that inconsistency. Further-
more, dependence upon drug profiles or informant's tips may also
lead to false positives as profiles may be overbroad, and inform-
ant's tips may be wrong. Although excessive nervousness and
unusual conduct may also seem like surefire signs of drug smug-
gling, these two characteristics may be attributed to non-related
factors such as anxiety disorder or mental illness.9 0
Even if an officer has reasonable suspicion to submit a sus-
pect to an X-ray search, another way for an officer to safeguard
against abuse is to give the suspect the option to return to the
place from which he came rather than enter the United States.1"'
This alternative gives the suspected smuggler the ability to choose
whether he will be subjected to the laws and procedures that gov-
ern his entrance into the United States. If the suspect does not
want to be subjected to an X-ray examination, he has the capacity
to return to his country of origin.'92 This option will serve to alle-
viate two problems: on one hand, the illegal narcotics will not
189. U.S. v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1380 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vega-
Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 1984).
190. National Mental Health Association, What is Mental Illness? at http://
www.nmha.orglinfoctr/factsheets/Il.cfin (discussing that anxiety is a disorder
indicative of mental illness, and sumptoms of mental illness include "changes in
mood, personality, personal habits and/or social withdrawl"); NAMI Nevada County
The County's Voice on Mental Illness, Warning Signs of Mental Illness at http://
www.nccn.netl-ncami/warnings.htm (listing signs of mental inllness to include
restless traveling from place to place, flat or inappropriate emotions, confused
disordered thinking, undue or continuing anxiety, and delusions); The Kim
Foundation, Warning Signs of Mental Illness at http://www.thekimfoundation.org/
html/signs.html.
191. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 565 (1985) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (describing that if the suspect does not want to consent to examinations or
detentions, "the Nation's customs and immigration interests are fully served by




enter the United States, and on the other, the suspected smuggler
will not be subjected to any kind of privacy infringement.
CONCLUSION
The partnership between Customs and the Department of
Radiology may only be a small endeavor, but its effects are wide-
spread and significant. This procedure assures the American peo-
ple both that the war on drugs continues to be fought, and that
drug smuggling suspects who enter the United States will be
treated in a way that will not cause them to suffer from a loss of
dignity. While there are currently no guidelines handed down by
the Supreme Court regarding the level of suspicion necessary for
an agent to conduct a non-routine X-ray search, an agent only
needs reasonable suspicion in order to subject a suspect to this
type of exam. An X-ray examination may subject one to significant
amounts of risk, and it can also reveal to the examiner other medi-
cal conditions that the suspect had desired to keep private. These
considerations are balanced by the fact that there is little indig-
nity suffered by a suspect who undergoes an X-ray search.
Because these factors demonstrate that an X-ray examination is
not overly intrusive, a customs agent should not be required to
have probable cause or obtain a warrant before continuing with
the procedure. This partnership is instrumental, and it should not
be hindered as it is an essential attack on the drug war. Although
the war on drugs is not currently the conflict at the forefront of the
American mind, Customs and Border Protection and the Depart-
ment of Radiology at the University of Miami School of Medicine
have taken one small step to ensure that this war has not been
forgotten.
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